TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=92TT2677> <title> Nov. 30, 1992: Yitzak Rabin:Peace Before Land </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1992 Nov. 30, 1992 Windsor: A House Dividing </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> THE MIDDLE EAST, Page 50 YITZAK RABIN: Peace Before Land </hdr><body> By Dean Fischer, William Dowell, Robert Slater and Yitzhak Rabin Q. Why did you suggest a meeting with President Assad? A. President Sadat of Egypt made a historic breakthrough in 1977 when he put an end to war and convinced both Egyptians and Israelis that he was ready to make peace. He broke down the walls of suspicion and prejudice. Today President Assad is not ready to do 2% of what Sadat did to convince Israel that he is ready to take unexpected or unusual steps to achieve peace. I said that I do not believe we can achieve peace without a meeting between the top political leaders of the two countries, because peace by correspondence has no meaning in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with its emotional backlog of hatred and suspicion. It has to be done in a way that would signal to both peoples that their leaders had decided to put an end to war and establish peace. Q. Many Arabs feel Sadat sacrificed his life by visiting Jerusalem and defying the rest of the Arab world. Is there another gesture Assad could make to prove his sincerity? A. As Prime Minister, I changed Israel's position on peace negotiations. I made it clear that we are ready to go along with Resolution 242 of the U.N. Security Council, which specifies withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries in the context of peace. The former government of Israel stressed "peace for peace" and nothing else. But I also said that the dimension of the territorial concession should not be negotiated before we know that Syria is ready for a full-fledged peace, with open boundaries for the movement of people in groups, diplomatic relations including embassies, and at least an agreement in principle for the normalization of relations. Secondly, I said that a peace treaty between Syria and Israel should not be influenced by the success or lack of success of negotiations with the other Arab delegations. I don't feel that Syria is ready for a full-fledged peace and a peace treaty that will stand on its own. Many Israelis wonder how Syria can be involved in the peace negotiations while allowing rejectionist Palestinian organizations with headquarters in Damascus to call for the Palestinians to withdraw from those negotiations. Although it is true that Hizballah is organized, inspired, financed and armed by Iran, its main bases in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley are under Syrian military control. Q. Is it possible to reach a separate Israeli-Syrian agreement, outside the wider Arab context? A. I don't believe it is possible to reach a comprehensive peace with all the Arab parties simultaneously. It has to be done on a bilateral basis. From 1949 until 1979, we achieved agreements with Arab countries only when we negotiated with one Arab partner at a time. Q. The Syrians insist on a comprehensive peace and contend that Sadat made a mistake in signing a bilateral treaty. A. I believe that without Sadat's courage and imagination there would have been no peace between an Arab country and Israel. He set the pattern. He proved that peace is not an illusion or a dream. Q. The Syrians insist on a comprehensive peace because they don't want to be isolated. A. In 1980 I interviewed President Sadat in Alexandria, and I asked him if he had opposed having King Hussein of Jordan join him at Camp David. He said, "You remember that we were twice on the verge of a breakdown in the 13-day meeting. If we had added Israel's problem with Jordan and the Palestinians to the problems between Egypt and Israel, there would have been no peace in the next 20 years." If you give one Arab partner a veto right over another, forget about achieving peace. Q. What are the hazards involved in negotiating with Syria? A. There are risks for both Syria and Israel. In any agreement we have to give tangibles; we get paper in return. Agreements on paper can be torn to pieces; tangibles have to be taken by force. When I say tangibles, I mean territory. We live in a region in which international agreements are not based on the Bible or the Koran. Two years ago, Iraq invaded, occupied and annexed Kuwait, in flagrant violation of inter-Arab agreements. If it can happen between two Arab countries, what is to stop it from happening between Arabs and Israel? Q. Egypt got the entire Sinai back in exchange for peace and diplomatic relations in the process of normalization. Why can't the same formula apply to the Golan Heights? A. The geography is different. In the Sinai, 250 km of desert separate Israel from that part of Egypt west of Suez. The widest area that separates us from the Syrians on the Golan is 23 km. I have said that I am ready to add a territorial dimension to the negotiations, but I don't want to negotiate the size of it before I know that Syria is ready for a peace that is not conditional on a comprehensive peace. We always strive for a comprehensive peace, but it has to be built on bilateral bridges. If we do not reach bilateral agreements with each of the parties, we will not reach a comprehensive peace with all of them. Q. Are there any circumstances under which you would consider full withdrawal from the Golan? A. I will not even go so far as addressing the question of withdrawal from the Golan without first knowing that Syria is ready for full-fledged peace, a peace that stands by itself. Q. If Assad came to Jerusalem prepared to sign a peace treaty, would that change your position on the Golan? A. You are not Assad. You don't represent Assad, and you are not Prime Minister of Israel. Unfortunately, the Syrian position as it was expressed by Foreign Minister Farouk Shara -- "total withdrawal for total peace" -- is not very clear. I don't know what total peace is. I do know what total withdrawal is. It is not limited to Syria and Israel. It also concerns the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Q. But could you apply his statements strictly to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations? A. I don't know. He has never told us. So far, the Syrians have made a clear distinction in the negotiations that what they call peace is the implementation of Resolution 242. That resolution doesn't speak about open boundaries or diplomatic relations. I don't make guesses. I have to make decisions, and decisions are made on concrete positions by the other side -- not on hypothetical questions. Q. During your election campaign you said you would try to reach an agreement with the Palestinians within a year. Do you still expect that to happen? A. I am sure within a year we will know whether this is feasible. I tend to believe that at least in one area we will reach an agreement, but we have a saying in the Middle East: "For war, one side is enough. For peace, you need two." Q. What is the most promising area for an agreement? A. Lebanon is a Syrian protectorate. The Lebanese dare not do anything without the approval of Damascus. We are not interested in a square inch of Lebanese soil or a cubic meter of their water. The problem there is security -- the absence of a Lebanese government that can control its sovereign soil and prevent terrorist acts against Israel. Jordan cannot have a separate peace without solving the Palestinian problem. That makes the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the Israeli-Syrian negotiations the two key questions. With Syria we have a partner, and a boss who makes decisions. To what extent Assad is ready for real peace is questionable; nobody discloses all his cards at the start of a negotiation. With the Palestinians it could be easier because there is no need now for territorial compromise on the part of Israel. Q. Do you think Clinton's victory will speed up or slow down the peace process? A. I believe the policy of the U.S. will be in support of the peace process. Q. Syria and other Arab states have proposed a complete ban on all weapons of mass destruction. Do you object? A. We have made it clear more than once that we are ready to make the Middle East nuclear-free, chemical- and biological-free zones, on the basis of bilateral agreements. Why? The Iraqis signed the NPT [nonproliferation treaty] and the International Atomic Energy Agency was supervising them. Did it discover anything there? Look at what happened. We believe in a regional agreement based on bilateral agreements between Israel and the countries in the region, as well as relevant, mutual supervision. On that basis, I am ready to sign tomorrow. Q. Do Iran's large arms purchases pose a strategic threat to Israel? A. No doubt. In addition, Iran can harass us through the activities of Hizballah in Lebanon and outside the Middle East. There are two lines of activity in the Middle East moving parallel to each other, each contradicting the purpose of the other. On the one hand, the peace negotiations; on the other, the acceleration of the arms race. Countries that are not part of the peace process -- Iran, Iraq and Libya -- are participants in the arms race. Therefore we have to take care of our defense capability to ensure that we will exist, to give enough security to our citizens and our vital interests, and to convince Arab leaders that they will achieve nothing through the use of force. Q. President Assad has been acquiring Scud missiles. Do you think Syria could go to war against Israel? A. We have to take into account that there might be a threat in case of a stalemate in the peace negotiations. I hope not. It would not be wise for Syria alone to initiate war against Israel. There is no longer a Soviet umbrella over the heads of some Arab countries. They cannot rely on the support of Iraq. Egypt will not join. Logic is not always the dominant fact in deciding events in the Middle East, but I tend to believe that it will not happen. But we have to be prepared for any eventuality. Q. With the cold war over, do you think Israel will continue to play a role as a strategic U.S. ally? A. That is for the U.S. to decide. As I see it, regional security will be an issue for the foreseeable future. We have seen what happened in the gulf crisis. Q. Some Arab leaders fear that if there is no progress in the peace talks, extremist fundamentalism will threaten stability. Does that concern you? A. We see it happening here and there, especially among the Palestinians. The question is, What is the conclusion of those who fear it on the Arab side? I believe it should lead them to negotiate more seriously with Israel, because the rise of fundamentalism is a result not only of our position but of their position too. They need to understand that agreement is reached by compromise on both sides. Q. Are you optimistic that total peace will be achieved in your lifetime? A. I hope it will be achieved. I don't know if it will be in my lifetime. </body></article> </text>